Agreements That Are Deemed Per Se Violations

Finally, at least one federal judge will find a non-compete clause for low-wage workers illegal in itself. The law is only slowly catching up with the real world. And the courts take time to take into account the realities of the market. But we are moving in that direction. In recent years, anti-dominant experts have begun to focus on labour market cartels. Federal authorities are now discussing labour market issues. As part of this movement, courts must reassess their ranking of non-compete (e.g.B. vertically or horizontally). Under this abridged version of the rule of reason, the Tribunal does not need to conduct the rigorous analysis of the anti-competitive effects and anti-competitive effects required by the rule of reason. Instead, the applicant only has to prove some form of market infringement. A court could apply the quick look analysis if the defendant`s conduct is of a nature that, while not illegal in itself, appears to have such likely anti-competitive effects that it is not necessary for a court to conduct the full analysis. The U.S.

Supreme Court at National Collegiate Athletic Ass`n v. Board of Regents of University of Oklahoma, 468 U.S. 85 (1984), commented that this quick look can sometimes be applied in the “blink of an eye.” Brokers can also insert a confirmation statement on the form attesting that commission rates and cooperative fractions are set independently. The next hurdle is the antitrust stance. However, there are many cases where anti-dominant rules are satisfied with regard to labour market restrictions. See z.B. In re High-Tech Employee Antitrust Litigation. It wasn`t a case of Apple/Google/Adobe poaching, etc. In this context, the contested restrictions have cracked down on wages and limited worker mobility. The court found the antitrust law and the violation satisfied. Similarly, abusive and inappropriate non-competition agreements related to non-competition have the same effects on the market (e.g.

B the abolition of wages and reduced mobility). The damage is much the same. A. Price information It should come as no surprise that the price charged by competitors is key information for a businessman. That`s the nature of competition. Learning what competitors demand can promote competition, as it allows the operator to get closer to the information one would have in a perfectly functioning market. Clearly accepted measures include: • examination and evidence of an anti-competitive effect (usually through the advice of economic experts); • verify whether the restriction is a restriction of price or production (unrelated to another pro-competitive good) or an ancillary agreement for another purpose; • the context of the behaviour through market analysis (relevant product and geographic markets); • the beneficial effects of competition; • compensation for the various competitive effects. See z.B. Todd v. Exxon Corporation, 275 F.3d 191, 198-200 (2nd Cir. 2001). Examples of horizontal behaviour examined according to the rule of reason are: • price agreements which actually lead to a new product, such as for example.

B a flat-rate licence. Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting System, 441 U.P. 1, 23-24 (1979). Cf. Addamax, 152 F.3d 48, 51-53 (1998) (The implementation of a joint venture strictly subject to the manufacture of a new product is assessed according to the basic rule). • performance restrictions within sports leagues. NCAA v.

University of Oklahoma Board of Regents, 468 U.P. 85, 100-01 (1984). • The simple exchange of price information. United States, 438 U.S. 422, 441 16 (1978); Todd v. Exxon Corporation, 275 F.3d 191, 199 (2nd Cir. 2001). • Joint venture agreements. Palmer v. BRG of Georgia, 498 U.S. 46 (1990); Addamax, 152 F.3d to 52; Cooperation guidelines § 3.2. • Joint purchasing agreements.

See z.B. Cartrade Inc. v. Ford Dealers Adv. . . .